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Criminalizing Endangerment
R. A. Duff
I. ATTACKS AND ENDANGERMENTS
Some crimes (types or tokens) consist in attacks on legally
protected interests. If I shoot at you, intending to injure you; or start
a fire, intending to damage your property; or lie to you, intending to
obtain money from you: I attack your interests in physical integrity,
in property, in not being harmfully deceived-attacks against which
the criminal law protects you. If my attack is successfully
consummated, I am (absent a further defense) guilty of wounding
with intent, of arson, or of obtaining by deception.' If my attack is
unconsummated, I am guilty of attempting to commit one of those
crimes; attempts are attacks that fail.'
Other crime types or tokens consist in endangering rather than
attacking legally protected interests. If, without intending harm, I act
in a way that I realize might injure you or damage your property, I
endanger your physical security or property; if, without intending to
deceive, I tell you that a certain bank is financially secure, realizing
that my statement might be false and might induce you to open an
account with that bank, I endanger your interest in having accurate
financial information to act upon. The criminal law protects these
interests against such endangerments. If the endangerment is
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1. See Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100, § 18 (U.K.); Criminal
Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § 1 (U.K.); Theft Act, 1968, c. 60, § 15 (U.K.). Since
wounding with intent requires an intention to injure, this crime type consists in an
attack. Since arson does not require an intention to damage, that crime type does
not consist in an attack; but since such an intention is sufficient mens rea for the
offense, some tokens of that type consist in attacks. Obtaining by deception
requires an 'intention of permanently depriving' the victim, and most tokens of this
crime type will indeed be attacks; but given the extended definition of that
'intention' in section 6, and the fact that 'deception' need only be 'reckless', the
crime type does not consist in an attack.
2. See Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c. 47, § l(l) (U.K.); R.A. Duff, Criminal
Attempts 221-28, 363-74 (1996).
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consummated-you are injured, your property is damaged, or my
statement is false-I might be guilty of wounding, of criminal
damage, or of fraudulent inducement to make a deposit.3 If the
endangerment is not consummated, I might or might not be guilty of
an offense, since English and American law have no general offense
of unconsummated endangerment analogous to that of
unconsummated attack. The Model Penal Code (§ 211.2) could
convict me of 'reckless endangerment' if I risked causing you serious
physical injury, but English law could convict me only if I
endangered you in one of the specific ways that are criminalized.4
Neither system criminalizes endangering property as such, although
I could be guilty if I endangered it by, for instance, causing an
explosion or starting a fire.5 In neither system is it normally criminal
to make a statement that I realize might be false, unless it actually is
false or misleading.6
My primary interest is in the ways in which endangerment is, or
should be, criminalized. However, we must first attend (in § 2) to the
distinction between attacks and endangerments, as two distinct types
of criminal wrong, before turning (in § 3) to the structure and scope
of endangerment offenses.
1I. DISTINGUISHING ATTACKS FROM ENDANGERMENTS
An attack is an action or omission that is intended to harm some
value or interest. I can attack your body by trying to injure you; your
tangible property by trying to steal or damage it; your reputation by
slandering you; your intellectual property by plagiarizing your work.
Attacks need not, however, be directed against particular people:
they can be indiscriminate, aimed at whoever happens to be in their
3. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100, § 20 (U.K.); Criminal
Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § I (U.K.); Banking Act, 1987, c. 22, § 35. 1 can
endanger another inadvertently and non-culpably, see infra note 12 and
accompanying text; in these cases, however, only the endangerer who is at least
reckless commits an offense.
4. See, e.g., Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, § 2 (U.K.); see also infra text
accompanying notes 60-63.
5. Explosive Substances Act, 1883, c. 3, § 2 (U.K.); Model Penal Code §
220.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
6. However, a sworn witness who makes a true material statement that she
does not believe to be true commits perjury under English law. Perjury Act, 1911,
c. 6 (U.K.). American law is similarly worded, see Model Penal Code § 241.1(1)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962); 18 U.S.C. 1621 (2004), but case law requires
falsity. See Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and Falsely Denying: How Moral
Concepts Inform the Law ofPerjury, Fraud, andFalse Statements, 53 Hastings L.J.
157, 176 (2001); Model Penal Code § 241.1 commentary at 94 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
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way; they can be aimed at institutions or practices, or even at more
abstract values, as when we call propaganda an attack on truth.
Both harm-intending mens and harm-threatening actus are
necessary for an attack. Firing a gun might endanger V, but it attacks
V only if it is intended to harm V. To form an intention to harm V,
however, or to make preparations to actualize that intention, is not yet
to attack V: the attacker must progress beyond the 'merely
preparatory', to be 'in the process of committing' the attack;7 and his
actions must engage appropriately with the world!
A certain hostility toward its object is intrinsic to an attack. It
need not be motivated by hatred: a contract killer or a fraudster might
feel no such animus toward their victims. Their actions, however,
manifest a practical hostility toward the interests or people they
attack, in that those actions are aimed against those people and their
interests;' their intentional structure is determined by the harm that
they are to cause. One who intends what would normally count as
harm might deny that her action is in this sense hostile: someone who
commits voluntary euthanasia might argue that her action manifests
the compassion that motivates it; someone engaged in consensual
sado-masochism might claim that his actions display the mutual
respect, and concern for each other's pleasure, that structure this
sexual encounter. What such people deny, however, is that their
actions constitute attacks, because they deny that what they intend
constitutes harm (just as a surgeon would deny that the amputation
she carries out constitutes an attack, since it is intended to benefit
rather than to harm the patient). There is of course room for
disagreement in such cases, and others would insist that such actions
still constitute wrongful attacks: in the case of euthanasia, on the
person killed (taking the right to life to be inalienable) or on the more
abstract value of life; in the case of sado-masochism, on the person's
'real' interests, or on some value that the person embodies." This,
however, would be to argue that what these agents intend does
constitute harm, and that their actions do manifest practical hostility
toward the interests or values against which they are now seen as
7. Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c. 47, § 1(1) (U.K.); R. v. Gullefer, [1990]
1 WLR 1063 (on "attempt," marking the fact that in ordinary discourse attempts
are attacks (The Model Penal Code (§ 5.01) stretches the idea of attempt further,
to include any "substantial step" toward the crime)). See Duff, supra note 2, at
53-61, 385-97. This is not to imply that we should never criminalize "merely
preparatory" conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
8. Suzanne M. Uniacke, Permissible Killing: The Self-Defence Justification
of Homicide 162 n.7 (1994); Duff, supra note 2, at 219-33, 380-83.
9. Compare DPP v. Smith, [1961] AC 290,327 (Lord Kilmuir); Hyam, [1975]
AC 55, 79 (Lord Hailsham) (a murderous action must be "aimed at" someone).
10. Compare, notoriously, Brown, [1994] 1 AC 212, appealed (unsuccessfully)
as, Laskey et al. v. U.K., [1997] 24 EHRR 39.
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directed. Such examples show, not that attacks are not by definition
hostile actions that are intended to do harm, but that there can be
normative disagreement about what counts as an attack.
Attacks typically endanger their objects: in attacking V, I create
a risk that she will suffer the harm I am trying to do her. However, I
can endanger V without attacking her, and our concern here is with
endangerments that do not constitute attacks: 'endangerment' will
hereafter mean 'endangerment that is not an attack'. Our concern is
also with endangerment as something that human agents do. Many
dangers, including some arising from human beings, involve no
human agency. There is a danger that visitors to my sickbed will
catch my infectious disease, but I am not endangering them, unless I
am failing to do something that I should do to protect them-such as
isolating myself. If I am a kind of person who is likely to commit
crimes of violence, I might be called dangerous, and risk-fearing
governments might look for ways of controlling or incapacitating
me:"x but I endanger others only if and when I begin to actualize my
dangerous disposition in violent action.
I endanger another if by act or omission I create a significant risk
that he will suffer harm (a risk is 'significant' if it provides a reason
against acting as I do, or for taking precautions in acting thus). If the
risk is not actualized, I merely endanger him; if it is actualized, I
endanger him and harm him. I endanger him whether or not I realize,
or could reasonably be expected to realize, the risk that I create:
while mens rea is necessary for an attack, endangerment need involve
only an actus reus-an act or omission that actually creates a suitable
risk. Criminal liability for endangerment can therefore be strict: I
can be guilty of an endangerment offense even if I did not (and could
not reasonably have been expected to) realize the risk I created. 12 If,
however, criminal liability should depend on fault, and we ask what
species of fault could justly make an agent criminally liable for the
danger she creates, we will naturally think not of an intention to do
harm, but of recklessness as the paradigm of fault, and of indifference
(rather than hostility) to the threatened interests as the practical
attitude that culpable endangerment displays. Someone who culpably
endangers others does not thereby display an active hostility toward
them; but in her willingness to take the risk of harming them, and her
failure to take adequate precautions against doing so (or even to
11. On the "risk society," and the threats it poses to justice, see Barbara
Hudson, Justice in the Risk Society (2003).
12. See, e.g., Water Resources Act, 1991, c. 57, § 85(1) (U.K.) (causing
poisonous matter to enter any controlled water); R. v. Milford Haven Port Auth.,
2 Cr. App. R.(S.) 423 (2000). It might, however, be hard to decide whether a
defendant "caused" the pollution without attending to fault. See Alphacell Ltd. v
Woodward [1972] AC 824.
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notice the risk she is creating), she shows that she does not care as she
should for their interests.
Given this distinction between attack and endangerment, we can
see how they constitute two distinct types of criminal wrong, with
different internal structures. One consists in an attack on some
legally protected interest-an action structured by the intention to
harm that interest, displaying practical hostility toward it. The other
consists in a failure of proper concern. I fail to take proper steps to
avoid, or even to notice, the danger that my conduct creates, and thus
take the risk that I will cause harm to others: but that harm is not the
object of my action; rather, it is a side-effect that I fail to care about
as I should. If I attack someone, the non-occurrence of the harm that
I intend marks the failure of my action-that is why the action
displays hostility to its victim. If I merely endanger them, however,
the non-occurrence of the prospective harm does not mark the failure
of my action: it might even be a source of relief for me-whereas
one who intends harm cannot, without forswearing that intention, be
relieved at his failure to cause it. 13
The difference in moral character between the kind of wrong I do
to one whose interests I attack, and the kind of wrong I do to one
whose interests I culpably endanger, lies in part in the difference
between being guided by wrong reasons and not being guided by right
reasons. If I wrongfully attack you, the harm that I intend figures in
my reasons for acting as I do: I act thus because I believe that by
doing so I will harm you-though that is not a reason by which I
should be guided. If I culpably endanger you, by contrast, my reasons
for acting as I do may be perfectly legitimate; what goes wrong is that
I am not guided by the reason against acting thus (the reason for
13. This distinction clearly has quite a lot in common with that drawn by
Jeremy Horder between "crimes where the focal case of wrongdoing is the
defendant's active engagement in bringing about (or trying to bring about) some
consequence, and crimes where the focal case of wrongdoing is the defendant's
(culpable) passivity, his or her failure to do enough to prevent an outcome." Jeremy
Horder, The Classification of Crimes and the Special Part of the Criminal Law, in
Defining Crimes: The Special Part of the Criminal Law 21, 33 (Anthony Duff &
Stuart Green eds., 2005). I cannot discuss the differences between us here. It is
also close in spirit to Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L.
Rev. 463 (1992). See also Kenneth W. Simons, Does Punishment for "Culpable
Indifference" Simply Punish for "Bad Character"?: Examining the Requisite
Connection Between Mens Rea andActus Reus, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 219, 313-15
(2002). For a critique of Simons, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Don 'tAbandon the
Model Penal Code Yet! Thinking Through Simons's Rethinking, 6 Buff. Crim. L.
Rev. 185 (2002). Contrast Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified
Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 931 (2000) (for a critique of
which, see Joshua Dressler, Does One Mens Rea Fit All? Thoughts on Alexander's
Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 955 (2000)).
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refraining from the action, or for taking precautions) that the risk of
harm to you provides.
This difference in moral character is, however, concealed by some
familiar approaches to understanding criminal wrongdoing. It is
concealed most thoroughly if we combine a simple understanding of
the Harm Principle with a 'choice' model of criminal fault. On
Feinberg's version of the Harm Principle, we begin (analytically) with
some identifiable harm, such as injury to the person or damage to
property; we then identify some human action as the cause of that
harm, which gives us an actus reus.'4 This 'conduct-cause-harm'
model does not yet give us a conception of criminal fault, but one
might naturally approach that issue by asking about the conditions
given which the action's agent should be held criminally liable for the
harm for which she is causally responsible-which is also to ask, if
we think that criminal liability should track culpable moral
responsibility, about the conditions given which she is culpably
morally responsible for that harm. A tempting answer, especially for
those who find their intellectual home in a liberal neo-Kantianism, is
that responsibility and culpability must depend on choice: I am
responsible for the harms I choose to cause, and culpable if I have no
justification or excuse for that choice. From this perspective,
intention and recklessness (defined as conscious risk-taking)
exemplify the same type of fault, since both consist in the choice to
cause or to risk causing harm: the only difference is that intention is
a more serious fault, since the merely reckless agent does not choose
actually to cause harm. Negligence is then either not a species of
'fault' at all, since it involves no culpable choice; or a lesser type of
fault, consisting in a failure to make choices (the choice to attend, or
to take care) that one could and should have made. 5
This model of criminal liability has been variously criticized.
One criticism concerns the concept of harm, and whether we can-as
Feinberg insists-always identify the harms that are to ground
14. Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others Chaps. 1-3 (1984). See also Paul H.
Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (1997). On Robinson, see also
R.A. Duff, Rule- Violations and Wrongdoings, in Criminal Law Theory: Doctrines
of the General Part (S. Shute and A.P. Simester ed., 2002).
15. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968); Andrew J.
Ashworth, Belief Intent and Criminal Liability, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence
1 (John Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 3d Series, 1987); Joshua Dressier, Reflections
on Excusing Wrongdoers, 19 Rutgers L.J. 671 (1988); Michael S. Moore, Placing
Blame: A Theory of Criminal Law Chap. 13 (1997); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan,
Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 597 (2001). (I realize that in
this paragraph I have constructed a composite figure which each of those cited here
might reject; but oversimplified though that figure is, it reveals some central strands
in contemporary theorizing.).
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liability independently of the wrongful actions that generate them. 16
Another focuses on the austere typology of wrongs that the 'conduct-
cause-harm' model implies: it identifies and categorizes wrongs
primarily by reference to the interests that they harm, and the extent
of the agent's culpable responsibility for those harms-whereas,
critics argue, an adequate account of the kinds of wrong that properly
concern the criminal law must draw on a richer, 'thicker', set of
ethical-legal concepts that reflect not just the causation of harm, but
the way, the context, and the spirit in which harm is done. 7 A third
kind of objection focuses on choice as the supposedly essential
determinant of criminal liability: quite apart from the question of
whether 'choice' can be so defined that it suffices for criminal
liability (whether we can specify a conception of 'free' choice that
will be sensitive to all the defenses that the law should recognize), it
is objected that choice is not necessary for liability-that we must
look as well, or instead, to the attitudes or dispositions that are
revealed both in agents' choices and in their unchosen responses."8
I will not rehearse these objections, or possible responses to them,
here. Instead, I want to note, first, that the moral difference between
attacks and endangerments is also less visible if we focus not on
choice, but on the dispositions or character traits that lie behind and
inform choice and action; and second, that the abstraction and
conceptual thinness of the 'conduct-cause-harm' model of criminal
wrongdoing might be more apt for endangerment offenses than for
attacks.
As to the first point, compare an agent who attacks another's
property not from malice, but simply as a means to a further end, with
one who consciously takes an unreasonable risk of damaging
another's property in the course of his intended enterprise: one cuts
down his neighbor's tree because it blocks his view; the other aims
to bum his own trees, but realizes that the fire might spread to his
neighbor's tree. Each, we might think, displays the same vice or
defect of character-a willingness to damage others' property in
16. See R.A. Duff, Harms and Wrongs, 5 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 13 (2001).
17. See e.g., Jeremy Horder, Rethinking Non-Fatal Offenses Against the
Person, 14 Oxford J. Legal Studs. 335 (1994); John Gardner, Rationality and the
Rule of Law in Offenses Against the Person, 53 Cambridge L.J. 502 (1994);
Stephen Shute & Jeremy Horder, Thieving andDeceiving: What is the Difference?,
56 Modem L. Rev. 548 (1993). On 'thick' ethical concepts, see Bernard Williams,
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Chap. 8 (1985).
18. See e.g., R.A. Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy
of Action and the Criminal Law Chap. 7 (1990); Kyron Huigens, Virtue and
Inculpation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1423 (1995); V.F. Nourse, Hearts and Minds:
Understanding the New Culpability, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 361 (2002); Kenneth W.
Simons, Culpability andRetributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence,
5 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 365 (1994). See also supra note 13.
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pursuit of his own ends, a serious indifference to others' rights and
interests; and we might then think that each commits the same kind
of wrong. If, however, we attend to the intentional structure of their
actions, and the practical attitudes manifested in (part-constituted by)
those actions, we can see that the actions constitute different types of
wrong. One is structured by the intention to damage another's
property; it is oriented toward and guided by the wrong that that
intention involves. The other is not thus structured by or oriented
toward wrong. 9 The argument that there is a significant moral
difference between attacks and endangerments thus depends on the
argument that criminal liability should be grounded in the character
of our actions."z
As to the second point, one objection to a 'conduct-cause-harm'
model for attacks is that by separating the harm from the conduct that
causes it, it hinders a recognition of the way in which the character of
the harm is partly determined by the meaning of the harming action
as an attack. The distinctive harm suffered by the victim of theft, for
instance, is not just that he loses property, a loss that could equally be
caused by natural mischance: it is that his property is stolen-that the
thief violates his interests and rights. Once we thus focus on the
wrong, on the harm qua wrongful, we see the importance of the thick
ethical concepts that characterize different kinds of wrongful
attack--characterizations that are unavailable on the 'conduct-cause-
harm' model."z In the case of endangerments, however, that
separation might not be so distorting, since the agent's action is not
structured by an intention to harm. What is wrong with action that
endangers another's life or property is, we might say, precisely that
it is liable to cause harm-harm that we can identify independently
of the action that causes it. If I am injured or my property is
damaged, not by an attack, but by another's culpably dangerous
conduct, I am still wronged, but the harm I suffer does not now seem
different in character from the harm I would suffer if I was injured or
my property was damaged by natural causes. In criminalizing attacks,
we might say, we are criminalizing harmful wrongs-wrongs that do
or threaten a relevant kind of harm; endangerment offenses, by
contrast, criminalize wrongful harms-harm-causing or harm-
threatening conduct that is wrongful because it is potentially harmful.
19. See Thomas Nagel, The Limits of Objectivity, in I Tanner Lectures on
Human Values 75, 131-35 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed., 1980). See infra text
accompanying notes 32-33 on cases in which the agent foresees harm as a certain,
not merely a likely, side-effect.
20. See Duff, supra note 2, Chap. 11; R.A. Duff, Action, the Act Requirement
and Criminal Liability, in Agency and Action 69 (John Hyman & Helen Steward
eds., 2004).
21. See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
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The tasks of definition and categorization might therefore be
simpler for endangerment offenses than they are for offenses that
consist in attacks. We must attend to the likelihood, nature and
seriousness of the harm that is caused or threatened, to the worth of
the conduct that creates the danger-all these bear on the
wrongfulness of the conduct. We must also attend to whether the
agent was or should have been aware of the risk, which bears on her
culpability. We need not, however, attend to the other kinds of factor,
such as the context in which, the intention with which, or the means
by which the harm was done, that bear on the moral character of an
attack.
To distinguish attacks from endangerments as different types of
criminal wrong is not yet to claim that this distinction is either
exhaustive or exclusive-that every crime type or token can be
classed unequivocally either as an attack or as an endangerment. It
is tempting to think that the distinction should be exhaustive-that
we should criminalize only what either attacks or endangers some
protected interest; but this might be a trivial truth if we identify a
public interest in the criminalization of any conduct that we see good
reason to criminalize. As for exclusivity, existing offense definitions
often capture both attacks and endangerments: I am guilty of criminal
damage if I damage another's property either purposely or
recklessly,2 and of simple assault if I cause bodily injury either
purposely or recklessly. 23  I comment later on whether this is
consistent with recognizing attacks and endangerments as different
types of wrong,24 but we must first turn briefly to a different question,
that of how sharply attacks and endangerments can be distinguished.
Two issues are worth noting.
22. Criminal Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § 1(1) (U.K.); Model Penal Code §
220.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
23. Model Penal Code, §211.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Offenses
Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100, § 20 (U.K.).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 53-58.
25. A third issue, which I cannot pursue in detail here, concerns the scope of
the intention that an attack requires: that it surely need not encompass every aspect
of the action that is essential to its character as an attack. Rape is an attack on its
victim's sexual interests and integrity. Rape, and attempted rape, require an
intention to sexually penetrate the victim, but neither requires intention (or
knowledge) as to her lack of consent, although if she consented the action would not
constitute an attack; in English law it is enough that the rapist does not reasonably
believe that the victim consents. Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 24, § 1 (1)(c) (U.K.).
The criminal law here follows the contours of the extra-legal concept of attack: but
how do we determine just what must be intended if an action is to constitute an
attack? I have proposed a solution to the analogous question in the law of attempts
elsewhere, see Duff, supra note 2 at 5-29: the "intent to commit an offense"
required for an attempt is an intention such that the agent would commit the relevant
offense in carrying it out. That solution should also help with attacks, but I cannot
R. A. DUFF 9492005]
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A. Intended Endangerment
An agent might intend, not to cause substantive harm, but to
create (or to expose another to) a risk of harm: I set fire to the house
of my rival in love, knowing he is inside, intending thereby to
frighten him into leaving town by exposing him to a risk of death or
serious injury. I attack his property, since I intend to damage it; but
surely I also attack him, even if I do not intend to injure him and will
be relieved if he escapes without injury.26 The same is true if I force
you into a 'game' of Russian roulette; or if I try to see how close I can
swing my golf club to your precious vase without actually hitting it,
when the risk of hitting your vase is part of the point of the exercise.27
(The last example shows that the agent who intends to create a risk
need not do so in order to create fear.)
Such intended endangerments should count as attacks. One way
to support this claim is to argue that the risk of harm is itself a harm,
so that one who intends to endanger intends to do harm. Such an
argument has some plausibility: we have an interest in being safe-in
being securely free of the risk of substantive harm; that interest is set
back when I am endangered, even if no substantive harm ensues.28
First, however, we should distinguish such harm from the kinds of
substantive harm on which it is parasitic-perhaps by calling it a
'secondary' harm:29 the risk of injury is 'secondary' to the 'primary'
harm of actual injury in that I have an interest in not being exposed
to such risk only because I have an interest in not being injured.
Second, we anyway do not need to count risks as harms in order to
count intended endangerments as attacks. We need only note that
intended endangerments share the crucial features of attacks: they are
aimed against those whom the agent intends to endanger; they are
intended to threaten, if not to harm, their victims' interests; they
manifest hostility rather than mere indifference. I will therefore take
endangerments, as distinct from attacks, to consist in the creation of
pursue its application here.
26. Compare Hyam, [1975] AC 55 (Lord Hailsham held such an intention to
be sufficient mens rea for murder.).
27. Compare Chief Constable of Avon and Somerset v. Shimmen, 84 Cr. App.
R. 7 (1987); see generally Jeremy Horder, Varieties ofintention, CriminalAttempts
and Endangerment, 14 Legal Stud. 335, 341-44 (1994).
28. See Claire Finkelstein, Is Risk a Harm?, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 963 (2003).
Finkelstein is right to argue that we can see risk as a harm, but she relies too heavily
on the argument that we must do so if punishment for endangerment is to be
consistent with the Harm Principle, id. at 987-99: for the Harm Principle, in either
its Millian or its Feinbergian version, permits the criminalization of conduct that
causes or threatens to cause harm.
29. Hyman Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice 124-25 (1979).
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risk without any intention to cause either the relevant substantive
harm or the risk of it.
(There are also offenses that consist in acting in ways that cause
or might cause fear, but need not involve the creation of actual risk.
If I threaten to kill you, intending you to fear that I will carry out the
threat, I commit an offense, even if I do not intend to carry it out and
there is no risk that I will.30 If I use 'threatening, abusive or insulting
words' within the hearing of someone who is 'likely to be caused
harassment, alarm or distress thereby', I might be guilty of an
offense.3' Such offenses constitute attacks, if they are intended to
cause fear; if they are not intended to cause fear, they constitute
endangerments.)
B. 'Oblique 'Intention
The intention to harm that attacks require is what is often called
'direct' intention; so-called 'oblique' intention, the foresight that my
action will cause harm as a side-effect, is not enough. One who acts
with or despite such foresight of harm does not manifest the kind of
hostility that an attack involves. She rather manifests her utter
indifference to the harm she expects to cause: she might wish or hope
that the harm would not ensue, but she is practically indifferent to it,
in that its prospect makes no difference to her action. Rather than
treating foresight of harm as a species of intention, as the terminology
of 'oblique intention' suggests, we should treat it (absent a
justification) as the limiting case of recklessness; someone who acts
with such foresight commits an extreme type of endangerment.
In classing 'oblique intention' with recklessness, rather than with
'direct' intention, I set myself against many theorists, and what might
be becoming the authoritative definition of intention in English
criminal law: 32 I am claiming not just that we can analytically
distinguish confident foresight from 'direct' intention (which is
uncontroversial), but that that distinction marks a significant moral
difference-a difference not necessarily in degree of culpability or
responsibility, but in moral kind. I will not try to defend that claim
30. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100, § 16 (U.K.). See also
Criminal Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § 2 (U.K.).
31. Public Order Act, 1986, c. 64, § 5 (and §§ 3-4) (U.K.). Compare assault,
an act by which I intentionally or recklessly cause V to apprehend immediate
personal violence. See J.C. Smith & Brian Hogan, Criminal Law 411 (10th ed.
2002).
32. For a survey of the debate, see Itzhak Kugler, Direct and Oblique Intention
in the Criminal Law: An Inquiry into Degrees of Blameworthiness (2002). On
English law, see Andrew J. Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 173-80 (4th ed.
2003).
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here,33 but the distinction I draw between attacks and endangerments
clearly depends on it.
The rest of this paper will focus on endangerments as distinct
from attacks, and on the question of how we should criminalize
various types of endangerment.
I. CRIMINALIZING ENDANGERMENT
If we ask why we should criminalize endangerment at all, an
initial answer seems easy. We owe it to each other not merely not to
attack each other, but to take reasonable care that we do not harm
each other in the course of our activities. However uncertain the
scope or stringency of our responsibilities to help others avoid harms
from other sources might be, and however uncertain we might be
about just what care we should take not to cause harm ourselves, we
cannot deny that we have some responsibility to try to avoid causing
harm by what we do. Sometimes harm is unavoidable; sometimes we
cause it justifiably, either because it is not a harm that in the particular
context we have reason to avoid causing, or because the reason we
have to avoid causing it is outweighed by better reasons in favor of
acting as we do. The fact, however, that a contemplated action might
well injure others' interests is, normally, a good reason against
undertaking that action, or for taking precautions against the
prospective harm; and it often provides a conclusive reason against
the action. If we act, without justification, in a way that we realize
might harm others, when that prospective harm provides a conclusive
reason against acting thus, we do wrong; we do wrong to those whom
we thus endanger. The wrong consists not merely in creating a risk
of harm, but in creating an unreasonable or unjustified risk of
harm-a risk whose unexcused creation manifests our lack of proper
concern for the interests of those we endanger.34
To say that one who creates an unjustified risk of harm does
wrong is not yet to say that her conduct should be criminalized. To
show that it should even in principle be criminalized,35 we would
33. But see Nagel, supra note 19; Duff, supra note 2, at 363-74; A. P.
Simester, Why Distinguish Intention from Foresight?, in Harm and Culpability 71
(A.P. Simester and A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).
34. I focus here on endangering others, and cannot discuss offenses that involve
endangering the agent rather than others. See, e.g., Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52,
§§ 14, 16 (U.K.) (on seat belts and crash helmets). I also focus on individual rather
than corporate activities, although the latter are the source of many of the most
serious dangers that concern the criminal law: since our ideas ofresponsible agency
are grounded in our conception of individual agency, an account of how dangerous
conduct should be criminalized must begin with dangerous conduct by individuals.
35. I.e., that it passes the first of the "filters" that Schonsheck identifies. See
Jonathan Schonsheck, On Criminalization 68-83 (1994).
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need to show that it is: (1) a matter that should concern the law at all,
rather than being a purely private matter to be dealt with by those
involved; and (2) that it should be a matter for the criminal law, rather
than for the civil law (as a dispute between the endangerer and the
endangered) or for a regulatory regime applying its own, non-criminal
rules and penalties.36 This would involve showing that the conduct
in question is not just (potentially) harmful, but wrong, and that the
wrong is a 'public' wrong that merits recognition and condemnation
by the polity: that it is public either materially, in that it threatens
harm to the collective rather than to identifiable individuals, or
symbolically, in that it is a kind of wrong to individuals that should
concern their fellow-citizens collectively.37
I take it that many types of endangerment do constitute public
wrongs in this sense, but I cannot pursue that issue in detail here. Nor
can I pursue the question of what kind of fault is appropriate for
endangerment offenses, though I suggested that recklessness is the
paradigm fault in endangerment: the practical indifference that the
reckless agent shows exemplifies the wrongfulness of
endangerment.38 This is not to say that recklessness should be the
requisite fault for all endangerment offenses, which would be to
condemn the many existing offenses that require only negligence, or
that make liability to some degree strict, but I cannot pursue here the
questions of when, if ever, negligence is an adequate basis for
36. The latter possibility is especially relevant to corporate activities.
However, while regulatory agencies often seek to secure compliance without direct
recourse to criminal prosecution, see Keith Hawkins, Law as a Last Resort:
Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency (2002), they usually operate
under the aegis of and in ultimate reliance on a criminal law that defines
endangerment offenses for which individuals or corporations can be convicted and
punished.
37. On these aspects of criminalization, see S.E. Marshall & R.A. Duff,
Sharing Wrongs, 11 Can. J. Law and Jur. 7 (1998); R.A. Duff, Punishment,
Communication, and Community 60-64 (2001).
38. I leave aside here the question of whether recklessness always requires
awareness of the risk one is taking. See supra text accompanying note 18.
However, the argument that recklessness can be constituted by the very failure to
notice a risk, when that failure manifests the appropriate indifference, is strongest
when the risk is integral to an attack, as when a violent assailant displays "extreme
indifference to the value of human life," Model Penal Code § 210.2(b) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962), in his very failure to advert to the obvious risk that he will kill
his victim, see Miller and Denovan (unpublished decision 1960), in G.H. Gordon,
2 The Criminal Law of Scotland 303-07 (M.G.A. Christie, 3d ed. 2000-2001); Parr
v. H. M. Advocate, 1991 SLT 208, or when the actualization of the risk turns an
action into an attack, as when a man is convinced, without good reason, that a
woman on whom he forces sexual penetration consents to it, see Morgan, [19761
AC 182, Cogan and Leak, [1976] QB 217. Perhaps recklessness in pure
endangerment offenses always requires conscious risk-taking: but I cannot pursue
this possibility here.
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criminal liability, or when, if ever, liability can properly be strict.39
I want to focus instead on the different ways in which we can
criminalize endangerment.
We can distinguish three general modes ofcriminalization.4 ° One
identifies as a 'public' wrong, meriting authoritative condemnation
by the criminal law, conduct that is already wrongful. Another gives
a more precise specification of a wrong whose scope is pre-legally
controversial or unclear. The third criminalizes conduct that was not
wrongful prior to its legal regulation, but that, once legally regulated,
becomes wrongful in virtue of the way it hinders the ends that the
regulation serves. Dangerous driving exemplifies the first mode, as
a malum in se. The offense of allowing a dog bred for fighting 'to be
in a public place without being muzzled or kept on a lead'
exemplifies the second mode.41 Owners of such dogs have some pre-
legal responsibility to take precautions against the harm that they
might cause, but people disagree about its precise scope; the law
provides a clear determination of that responsibility. The offense of
having a firearm without a certificate exemplifies the third mode.42
Without a legal regulation requiring certification, it could not be
wrong to possess a firearm without a certificate, but if the creation of
such an offense is justified, it is because the regulation helps to
prevent harms of relevant kinds. Breaches of the regulation are
therefore wrongful because they threaten to undermine that harm-
preventive goal.43
We can clarify these different modes of criminalization, and the
problems of principle that they sometimes present, by drawing some
more systematic distinctions between different kinds of endangerment
offense, and examining some of the issues that those distinctions
raise.44
A. Consummate v Nonconsummate Offenses
Endangerment offenses are consummate if their commission
requires the actualization of the relevant risk, the occurrence of the
relevant harm; wounding and criminal damage, when committed
39. See Appraising Strict Liability (A. P. Simester ed., 2005).
40. See Duff, supra note 37 at 56-66; see also R.A. Duff, Crime, Prohibition
and Punishment, 19 J. Appl. Philos. 97 (2002).
41. Dangerous Dogs Act, 1991, c. 65, § 1(2)(d) (U.K.).
42. Firearms Act, 1968, c. 39, §§ 1-2 (U.K.).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 67-81.
44. See Douglas N. Husak, The Nature and Justifiability of Nonconsummate
Offenses, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 151 (1995) (usefully analyzing several of these
distinctions).
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recklessly, are examples.45 They are nonconsummate when they are
defined 'in the inchoate mode', and do not require the actualization
of the risk; reckless endangerment and dangerous driving are
examples.46 Two structural questions arise here.
First, the law sometimes distinguishes consummate from
nonconsummate endangerment offenses: it distinguishes homicide
from reckless endangerment, and causing death by dangerous driving
from dangerous driving.47 Sometimes, however, it criminalizes only
the consummate offense, as with criminal damage.48 Sometimes it
criminalizes only the nonconsummate offense, as with perjury-a
sworn witness who makes a material statement that she does not
believe to be true commits perjury whether or not her statement is
false, or believed.4 9 I will discuss shortly the question of whether we
should have a general offense of nonconsummate endangerment,
analogous to that of attempt: the question here is why the law should
sometimes distinguish consummate from nonconsummate forms, and
sometimes not. The main reason to distinguish them lies in the
argument that 'resulting harm' makes a significant difference to the
character and seriousness of the wrong committed: one who causes
the harm that she recklessly risks causing commits a wrong different
from, and more serious than, one who fortunately does not cause the
harm; she has something more to repent and to answer for. I will not
rehearse that argument here,5" but if resulting harm is thus significant,
we must question the practice of defining some offenses in the
inchoate mode: should not the law mark that significance by
distinguishing consummate from nonconsummate versions of all
offenses?
One answer might be that the resulting harm is not always that
significant: for instance, that the essential wrong involved in perjury
lies not so much in its possible effects (the court being misled) as in
45. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100, § 20 (U.K.); Criminal
Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § 1(1) (U.K.).
46. Model Penal Code § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Road Traffic
Act, 1988, c. 52, § 2 (U.K.). See also Andrew J. Ashworth, Defining Criminal
Offenses Without Harm, Criminal Law: Essays in Honour of J.C. Smith 7 (Peter
Smith ed., 1987).
47. Model Penal Code §§ 210, 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962); Road
Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, § 1-2 (U.K.).
48. See supra text accompanying note 5.
49. Perjury Act, 1911, c. 6, § 1 (U.K.). For other examples, see Ashworth,
supra note 46. The example of perjury reminds us that it might not always be clear
just what the threatened harm is: is it that the statement is false; or that it is false
and believed; or that it is false and believed, and leads to an incorrect or unjust
decision?
50. See Duff, supra note 2, Chap. 12; D.Z. Phillips, How Lucky Can You Get?,
Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars: Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees 165 (D.Z.
Phillips & P. Winch eds., 1989).
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the contempt for the law that the perjurer displays. This answer
seems implausible for perjury (if my recklessness as to the truth of my
evidence leads to an unjust verdict, I have surely committed a greater
wrong than if I am disbelieved), and for 'result crimes' generally: if
a crime's wrongfulness does not significantly depend on any further
consequences of the offender's conduct, it is a 'conduct crime', not
a result crime defined in the inchoate mode.5' A more plausible
answer is that definition in the inchoate mode makes it easier to prove
guilt when it might be hard to prove that a defendant's conduct did
cause the relevant harm:52 but this would suggest at most that both
consummate and nonconsummate versions of the offense should be
available, not that they should not be distinguished. I return shortly
to the question of how broad the range of nonconsummate offenses
should be, but the argument so far suggests that when we have good
reason to criminalize nonconsummate as well as consummate
endangerment offenses, we also have good reason to distinguish
them.
The second question is: if attacks and endangerments are distinct
types of wrong, should the law not define them as distinct types of
offense? Sometimes it does so: wounding with intent is distinguished
from wounding (which can be committed recklessly) in English law;53
murder requires an intention at least to cause serious bodily injury,
and one who causes death through mere recklessness is guilty only of
manslaughter.54 Often, however, it does not: D commits the same
offense of criminal damage whether she damages V's property
deliberately or only recklessly;55 the same offense of assault whether
51. On "result" and "conduct" crimes, see Gordon, supra note 38, vol. I, at 59.
Rape is a conduct crime, see Smith & Hogan, supra note 31, at 30-31, since while
it can have devastatingly harmful consequences for its victim, its essential
wrongfulness lies in the very act of rape: it is therefore so defined that its
commission does not require proof of the occurrence of such further harmful
consequences; but we should not say that it is defined "in the inchoate mode".
52. See Ashworth, supra note 46, at 17-18, for some salutary skepticism about
this answer.
53. Offenses Against the Person Act, 1861, c. 100, §§ 18, 20 (U.K.). See
Violence: Reforming the Offenses Against the Person Act 1861Annex (Home
Office, 1998) (Draft Offences Against the Person Bill §§ 1-2) [hereinafter Draft
Offences Against the Person Bill].
54. See Smith & Hogan, supra note 31, at 359-61 (although English law seems
to count certain foresight as intention, see supra text accompanying note 32). Even
when the mens rea of murder is defined in terms of "recklessness," as with "wicked
recklessness" in Scots law, it is arguable that the recklessness that is to make a killer
guilty of murder must be displayed in the course of an attack on another person.
See Gordon, supra note 38, vol. II, at 295-310; compare Model Penal Code §
210.2(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
55. Criminal Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § 1(1) (U.K.); Model Penal Code §
220.3 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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she injures V deliberately or recklessly.56 Of course there are limits
to the extent to which the law's definitions of offenses should reflect
significant moral distinctions, but it should in principle reflect a
categorial difference such as that between attacks and endangerments,
both to advance 'fair labeling',57 and to ensure that matters that bear
significantly on sentencing (as the difference between deliberate and
merely reckless actions surely should bear) are properly proved in
court. This might cause problems if the prosecution can prove that D
recognized a risk of the relevant harm, but is not sure that it can prove
intention. These problems, however, could be remedied by counting
the endangerment form of the offense as an 'included' offense in
relation to the attack form.58
B. General v Specific Offenses
We can focus now on nonconsummate endangerment offenses,
since these raise the main questions that concern us here.
Such offenses can be more or less general or specific, as to the
interest that is threatened, or as to the way in which it is threatened.
Robinson proposes a general offense of 'act[ing] in a way that creates
a substantial and unjustified risk of causing a result made criminal by
this Code': an offense that specifies neither a particular kind of
threatened harm nor a particular mode of conduct.5 Existing offenses
are more specific in one or more ways: as to the type of (usually
serious) harm that is threatened; 60 or as to the (usually especially
dangerous) activity that creates the risk;6' or as to the agent (someone
56. Model Penal Code § 211.1(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also
Smith & Hogan, supra note 31, at 411-19 (on assault and battery); Draft Offences
Against the Person Bill, supra note 53, § 3 (defining a single offense of
"intentionally or recklessly caus[ing] injury").
57. See Ashworth, supra note 32, at 89-92.
58. See Criminal Law Act, 1967, c. 58, § 6(3) (U.K.); Model Penal Code §
1.07(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
59. Robinson, supra note 14, at 218 (§ 51 of his Draft Code of Conduct). The
offense requires at least recklessness as to the risk. See id. at 225 (§ 200 of the
Draft Code of Adjudication).
60. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 211.2 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious
bodily injury"); 2 Gordon, supra note 38, at 427-30 (the Scottish offense of
"causing danger to the lieges by culpable recklessness"); Australian Model Criminal
Code, §§ 5.1.25-6, in D. Lanham, DangerDown Under, [1999] Crim. L. Rev. 960,
965-67.
61. See, e.g., Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, §§ 2, 4, 12, 22, 40 (U.K.);
Explosive Substances Act, 1883, c. 3, § 2 (U.K.) (causing explosions that are
"likely to endanger life or to cause serious injury to person or property");
Dangerous Dogs Act, 1991, c. 65, § 3 (U.K.) (criminalizing those in charge of dogs
that are "dangerously out of control in a public place" (and defining danger in terms
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with special responsibilities) who creates the risk;6 2 or as to the
(usually especially vulnerable) potential victims. 63
The obvious question is: why should we not operate with a
wholly general endangerment offense like that proposed by Robinson,
analogous to the law of attempts?' Why should we instead maintain
this incomplete kaleidoscope of specific offenses?
A retributivist argument in favor a general offense is that even if
the non-occurrence of the harm makes a significant difference to the
character of the endangerer's conduct, one who culpably risks causing
a kind of harm that would make her criminally liable if it ensued still
commits a wrong, of a kind that in principle merits public
condemnation. A consequentialist argument is that such an offense
would provide a more effective deterrent against dangerous conduct,
and so against actually harmful conduct. A related argument is that
absent such a general offense, legislators are prone to try to fill
perceived gaps in the law with often ill-drafted new specific offenses,
to criminalize kinds of conduct that come to be seen as worryingly
dangerous.
On the other hand, from the point of view of penal desert, we
must askwhether the kind of wrong involved in nonconsummate
endangerment is always serious enough to merit the coercive
attentions of the criminal law, and the various costs that
criminalization involves.65 This question gains force if, as I have
argued elsewhere, the non-occurrence of a prospective harm makes
a more significance difference to the moral character of the action in
the case of endangerment than it does in the case of attack:66 while a
failed attack is structured by the harm it is intended to do, a luckily
harmless act of endangerment is further removed from the harm that
it might have caused, but did not cause; the former is still intrinsically
or essentially harmful, while the latter is only potentially harmful. As
of injury to the person)); Food Safety Act, 1990, c. 16, § 8 (U.K.) (selling food that
"fails to comply with food safety requirements").
62. See, e.g., Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, c. 37 (U.K.). (employers);
Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, c. 114, §§ 58, 98, 100 (U.K.) (masters, seamen, ship-
owners).
63. See, e.g., Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, c. 12, §§ 1, 11 (U.K.);
Mental Health Act, 1983, c. 20, § 127 (U.K.). See generally K. J. M. Smith,
Liability for Endangerment: English Ad Hoc Pragmatism and American
Innovation, 1983 Crim. L. Rev. 127; Peter R. Glazebrook, Blackstone's Statutes on
Criminal Law 80-140 (14th ed. 2004).
64. See Criminal Attempts Act, 1981, c. 47, § 1 (U.K.); Model Penal Code §
5.0 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (neither offense is entirely general: English law
criminalizes only attempted indictable (not summary) offenses; the Model Penal
Code criminalizes only attempted crimes, not attempted violations). I leave aside
here the issue of how we should specify the conduct element of such an offense.
65. See Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish the Deserving?, 26 Nous 447 (1992).
66. See Duff, supra note 2, at 363-66.
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for efficient deterrence, we should note that such a general offense
would no doubt be enforced even more selectively than are our
existing endangerment laws, given both the likely concentration of
resources on what are perceived as the more serious kinds of harm,
and the extent to which endangerment is often only noticed when it
actually causes harm. Given the familiar dangers involved in
allowing officials too extensive a discretion in selecting which cases
to investigate or prosecute, we might see good reason to limit that
discretion by criminalizing only the more serious kinds of
endangerment: those that are more serious in virtue either of the kind
of risk that they create, or of the fact that they actually cause the
threatened harm-which is what our existing laws effectively do.
Such considerations do not tell us just how general or specific, in
which ways, our endangerment laws should be, and do not rule out a
'reckless endangerment' offense as general as that defined by § 211.1
of the Model Penal Code: they do suggest, however, that we have
reason not to embrace a wholly general offense of the kind proposed
by Robinson.
C. Explicit v Implicit Offenses
Endangerment offenses are explicit when their commission
requires the actual creation of the relevant risk-a risk specified in
the offense definition; they are implicit if their definition does not
specify the relevant risk (the risk that grounds their criminalization),
so that they can be committed without creating the risk.67 Dangerous
driving and 'reckless endangerment' are explicit endangerment
offenses. Driving 'with alcohol concentration above prescribed
limit', speeding, pretending to be a legally recognized doctor, are
implicit endangerment offenses:68 although the conduct that they
criminalize is criminalized because it is liable to lead to kinds of harm
that concern the criminal law, no explicit reference to such harms
appears in these offense definitions. Conviction for an explicit
endangerment offense requires proof that the defendant created a risk
of harm of the relevant kind; no such proof is required for an implicit
endangerment offense, nor would proof that the defendant did not
create such a risk-for instance that this driver's competence was not
impaired by consuming an amount of alcohol that put her over the
limit-save her from conviction.69
67. See Husak, supra note 44, at 168-69 (on "complex" and "simple" non-
consummate offenses).
68. See Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, § 5 (U.K.); Road Traffic Regulation Act,
1984, c. 27, §§ 81-89 (U.K.); Medical Act, 1983, c. 41, § 49 (U.K.).
69. The "explicit"/"implicit" distinction drawn here depends on identifying the
kind of harm with which each offense is primarily concerned: where there is
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Explicit endangerment offenses typically declare 'standards',
whereas implicit offenses lay down 'rules' .7 To convict a person of
an offense of explicit endangerment, the court will have to find not
just that he created a significant risk of harm that constituted a reason
against acting as he did, but that, for instance, the risk was
'substantial and unjustifiable',7" or that his conduct fell 'far below
what would be expected of a competent and careful' agent, and would
have been seen as obviously dangerous by such an agent.72 Such
determinations will require attention not merely to the seriousness
and likelihood of the threatened harm, and to the value of the activity
that creates the risk, but to the context of that activity and to the
responsibilities (to take care or precautions) that can plausibly be
assigned to the defendant and to others."
The merit of criminalizing endangerment through offenses of
explicit endangerment is that-if the law is properly applied-we
criminalize only those who actually endanger others in ways that
deserve condemnation.74 The drawback is that, unless we can rely on
some quite specific shared understandings of what counts as an
'unreasonable risk', and of what kinds of care agents should take, in
a range of contexts, the standards that courts have to apply will not be
the polity's shared standards, but will be the individual standards of
uncertainty or disagreement about what the harm is, there might therefore also be
uncertainty or disagreement about whether the offense is one of explicit or of
implicit endangerment.
70. See Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985).
71. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c), § 211.2 (defining recklessness) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962).
72. Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, § 2A (U.K.) (on the meaning of "dangerous
driving"). Also consider Robinson's Draft Code of Adjudication § 113: "creating
a prohibited risk" (§ 51 of his Code of Conduct, supra note 59) requires "a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding person." Robinson, supra
note 14, at 224.
73. Cases involving the risk of HIV transmission through sexual intercourse
exemplify the issues here. See Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Non
Fatal Offenses Against the Person 75-87 (1998), available at
http://www.aic.gov.au; Lanham, supra note 60. The risk is statistically low, perhaps
I in 2,000; so, does criminalization mark a familiar kind of moral panic, or a
judgment based both on the seriousness of the harm and on the breach of trust?
However, to talk of a breach of trust presupposes a particular view of the parties'
responsibilities in sexual activity-a view that might be arguable in some contexts.
74. Perhaps not all those who commit explicit endangerment offenses actually
endanger others: the reckless driver who rounds a blind comer on the wrong side
of the road might reasonably deny that he has endangered anyone, if there was in
fact no one there. However, his conduct is still criminally dangerous, given the real
(and unjustified) risk of someone being there. It is cases like this that justify the
Model Penal Code's definition (§ 211.2) of "reckless endangerment" as "conduct
which places or may place" others in danger, and that show why "or may place" is
not. See Lanham, supra note 60.
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each court and its members-which generates the familiar defects of
uncertainty in the law's content, and unpredictability and
inconsistency in its application. This drawback grounds one reason
in favor of offenses of implicit endangerment, as a brief look at some
familiar road traffic offenses will illustrate.
English law defines explicit endangerment offenses of driving
when unfit through drink or drugs, and of dangerous driving; and
implicit endangerment offenses of driving with more than a specified
concentration of alcohol in one's blood, and of exceeding the
specified speed limit.75 The implicit offenses lay down rules that are
intended to capture part of the content of the standards declared in the
explicit offenses. An obvious attraction of such implicit offenses for
prosecutors is that they make proof of legal guilt easier; but that does
not speak to their justice.76 Another, wider attraction is that they
promote certainty and consistency: citizens can know what they may
or may not do;7 courts can apply the law with greater consistency.
Such offenses will, however, capture some drivers whose conduct is
not in fact appropriately dangerous: a driver whose capacity and
willingness to drive safely are not impaired by an amount of alcohol
that puts him over the legal limit still commits an offense if he drives
after drinking that much, though he does not thereby create the
increased risk of harm that justifies this drink-driving law; so too for
a driver whose skills and car are such that she can drive as safely at
speeds well over the legal limit as others can at speeds within the
limit." Can it be fair to demand that such people obey these laws,
and just to convict them if they do not?
Such people might still be acting dangerously: if they believe that
they are driving safely, but cannot rightly claim to know that they are
safe after drinking that much or at that speed, we might say that in
driving as they do they take an unreasonable risk that their belief is
false. The point is not just that human beings are fallible. It is rather
that there are particular reasons for mistrusting drivers' judgments on
such matters: we are notoriously prone to exaggerate our driving
skills, and someone who is in a hurry, or who has already had a drink,
is not well placed to decide whether he can drive safely at that speed,
75. Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, §§ 2-5 (U.K.); Road Traffic Regulation Act,
1984, c. 27, §§ 81-89 (U.K.).
76. See Ashworth, supra note 32, at 85-86.
77. It might be hard to identify the point at which another drink would put me
over the limit, but the law conveys the message that drinking any alcohol before
driving is risky ("Don't drink and drive"), which opens the way to the "thin ice"
principle: once we start to drink we are on thin ice, and "can hardly expect to find
a sign which will denote the precise spot where [we] will fall in." Knuller, [1973]
AC 435, 463 (Lord Morris). See Ashworth, supra note 32, at 74-75.
78. Hence the common complaint that rules, ifthey are not under-inclusive, are
over-inclusive.
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or after another drink. We can thus see some implicit endangerment
offenses as specifying precautions that everyone should take against
causing or risking harm, in contexts in which we should not trust our
own case-by-case judgments about how to act safely. Given the risks
involved in the activity concerned, given our proneness to
misjudgment, we should follow relatively simple rules ('Don't drink
and drive'; 'Don't exceed the speed limit'), rather than allowing
ourselves to decide on each occasion how fast to drive or how much
to drink before driving.79 The law demands not just that we drive
safely, but that we ensure that we do so;"0 such implicit endangerment
offenses declare that part of what we must do to ensure safety is to
obey these restrictions.
Surely, however, there are people who know that they can safely
break such rules: drivers who know that they can drive safely
although over the legal limit as to their speed or alcohol intake. Can
we argue that they nonetheless ought to obey such laws; or must we
admit that they should injustice be exempt, and that to convict them
is to sacrifice their rights for the sake of the greater social good that
flows from not allowing such public exceptions to the law? We might
appeal to two considerations. First, we owe it to each other not
merely to ensure that we act safely, but to assure each other that we
are doing so, in a social world in which we lack the personal
knowledge of others that could give us that assurance. We provide
such assurance, in part, by visibly following public safety-protecting
rules, such as the speed limit.81 Second, a driver who claims to know
that he can safely ignore such rules claims a certain superiority over
his fellows: they must obey these rules, because they cannot be
trusted to decide for themselves, but I need not. What is wrong with
such a claim is not that it is false (though it often will be), but that it
is a denial of fellowship with my fellow citizens: a recognition of
fellow citizenship (and of the dangers involved in allowing
exemptions to the law's demands) should motivate me to accept such
laws even if I believe (truly) that they are unnecessary in my case. At
least so long as the demands the law makes on me are not that
onerous, this is a modest burden that I ought to accept as an
implication (and expression) of citizenship.
79. This argument embodies a familiar rule-consequentialism. See R.M. Hare,
Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point (1981).
80. Compare Health and Safety at Work Act, 1974, c. 37 §§ 2-3 (U.K.) (on
employers' duties to 'ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable', the health and
safety of their employees and others).
81. Similar considerations also apply to the requirements that drivers be
licensed, after passing a test, and that they carry at least third party insurance: these
are ways of ensuring and assuring that drivers are minimally competent and that
payment will be made for the damage they cause.
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The arguments sketched here will not justify all the implicit
endangerment offenses that our laws currently contain-nor should
they; but they can justify some such offenses."
D. Direct v Indirect Offenses
Endangerment offenses are direct if the relevant harm would
ensue from the criminalized conduct without any intervening
wrongful human action; they are indirect if the harm would ensue
only given further, wrongful actions by the agent or by others. Thus,
dangerous driving standardly involves direct endangerment, as does
causing a dangerous explosion. 3 Carrying firearms or offensive
weapons in public, however, involves only indirect endangerment,
since the relevant harms would normally ensue only if the firearms or
weapons were then misused by the carrier or by others.8 4 A
complication arises when the intervening actions would be by
children, or by people who are acting quite reasonably. If I supply a
gun to a child, ' or wave a gun at someone who does not know it is
unloaded,86 harm might flow from what the child does with the gun,
or from what the other person does to escape the perceived threat; but
my conduct might still count as 'directly' dangerous, if we see the
intervening agency as suitably 'innocent'. We should count
endangerment as strictly 'indirect' only if the occurrence of the
relevant harm would depend on a genuine, non-innocent, novus actus
interveniens.87
82. But see Douglas Husak, Malum Prohibitum andRetributivism, in Duff and
Green, supra note 13, for a critique of this line of argument.
83. See supra note 61.
84. Firearms Act, 1968, c. 39, § 19 (U.K.); Prevention of Crime Act, 1953, c.
14, § 1 (U.K.); Criminal Justice Act, 1988, c. 33, § 139 (U.K.) (these are also
offenses of implicit rather than explicit endangerment). Offenses of possessing or
supplying drugs are also offenses of indirect implicit endangerment-and are
controversial partly because oftheir uncertain relationship to criminally significant
harm. See Douglas Husak, Drugs and Rights (1992). Possession offenses more
generally provide good examples of the way in which the criminal law can be
extended to capture kinds of conduct (or state) that are at worst indirectly
dangerous. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and
the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 829 (2001); Markus Dirk
Dubber, The Possession Paradigm: The Special Part and the Police Power Model
of the Criminal Process, in Duff and Green, supra note 13.
85. Compare Firearms Act, 1968, c. 39, § 24 (U.K.).
86. See, e.g., Thomas v. Commonwealth, 567 S.W.2d 299 (Ken. 1978);
Commonwealth v. Gouse, 429 A.2d 1129 (Penn. 1981).
87. On novus actus interveniens, see Andrew P. Simester & G. Robert Sullivan,
Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine 91-103 (2d ed. 2003). See Khaliq v. H. M.
Advocate, 1984 JC 171; Ulhaq v H. M. Advocate, 1991 SLT 614. In both cases,
the defendants were convicted of an offense of endangerment, for supplying
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Offenses of direct endangerment are in principle
unproblematic-or no more problematic than the doctrines of
causation on which they depend. Offenses of indirect endangerment
are, however, more problematic, whether the occurrence of the harm
would depend on the agent's own further actions, or on those of
others.
What argues against criminalizing conduct that would become
directly dangerous only in virtue of further actions by the agent
herself is the general principle of respect for autonomy: the law
should not prohibit intrinsically harmless conduct on the mere
grounds that the agent might go on to create a risk of harm, since this
fails to treat citizens as responsible agents who can be expected to
recognize and respond to the good reasons that the law anyway offers
for not going on to create such risk. This principle is qualified when
the law criminalizes conduct that is preparatory to an intended
attack,88 but such a qualification is already controversial, as denying
the agent a suitable 'locus poenitentiae'. If we also extend the law
to cover cases in which what is in prospect is not an attack, but mere
endangerment, we surely separate the law of endangerment too far
from the wrongful harms that should be its primary focus.9" The only
other kind of case in which the principle might be qualified is that in
which there is particular reason to think that the agent cannot be
trusted to be responsive to reasons; an example might be the drunk-
driving provision that criminalizes not just anyone who 'drives or
attempts to drive', but anyone who 'is in charge of a motor vehicle'
when over the limit.9'
Usually, of course, conduct that is indirectly dangerous in virtue
of what the agent might do is also indirectly dangerous in virtue of
materials that they knew would be used for glue sniffing. In Khaliq, the buyers
were children, but the court did not rely on this, and, in Ulhaq, they were adults; the
offense was thus treated as one of indirect endangerment.
88. See, e.g., Criminal Law Act, 1967, c: 58, § 4 (U.K.) (doing "any act with
intent to impede [the] apprehension or prosecution of an offender"); Criminal
Damage Act, 1971, c. 48, § 3(a) (U.K.) (possession of something intending that it
be used to damage another's property): Jeremy Horder, Crimes of Ulterior Intent,
in Simester and Smith, supra note 33, at 153.
89. See Duff, supra note 2, at 35-37, 386-89.
90. Bearing in mind that if the agent acts with the intention of going on to
endanger others, his conduct is preparatory to an attack, not to mere endangerment.
See supra test accompanying notes 26-31. Compare Explosive Substances Act,
1883, c. 3, § 3(b) (U.K.) (possessing or making explosives "with intent by means
thereof to endanger life").
91. Road Traffic Act, 1988, c. 52, § 5(l)(b) (U.K.). It is worth noting,
however, that under section 5(2) it is a defense for a person charged with this
offense "to prove that at the time he is alleged to have committed the offence the
circumstances were such that there was no likelihood of his driving the vehicle"
while he was over the limit. Id. § 5(2).
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what others might do. When the occurrence of a direct risk of harm
would depend on the conduct of others, we must ask different
questions about the extent of our responsibilities to assist in
preventing crime: how far can a polity justifiably demand that its
citizens constrain their own otherwise lawful conduct because of the
risk that others might take advantage of it, or be encouraged or
enabled by it, to commit crimes?92 I do not have, and do not think we
can aspire to, a general answer to this question: without the kind of
detailed examination of different offenses that we cannot embark on
here, the most we can say is (vaguely) that we surely have some such
responsibility, and that its precise scope will depend on weighing
such factors as the onerousness of the restraint it involves, and the
likelihood and seriousness of the offenses that might then ensue.
My aim in this section has not been to answer the various
questions, or to solve the various problems, that I have identified. My
aim in the paper as a whole has rather been to clarify the character of
endangerment as a distinctive kind of wrongdoing (distinct in
particular from attacks), to show the different ways in which
endangerment offenses can be structured and defined, and to raise
some of the questions that must be answered if we are to develop a
just and acceptable criminal law of endangerment.
92. See Andrew von Hirsch, Extending the Harm Principle: "Remote "Harms
and Fair Imputation, in Simester and Smith, supra note 33, at 259.
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